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The nature of free-will as a subset of intentionality and probabilistic and deterministic
function is explored with the indications being that human behavior is highly predictable
which in turn, should compromise the notion of free-will. Data supports the notion that age
relates to the ability to progressively effectively establish goals performed by fixed action
patterns and that these FAPs produce outcomes that in turn modify choices (free-will)
for which FAPs need to be employed. Early goals require behaviors that require greater
automation in terms of FAPs that lead to goals being achieved or not; if not, then
one can change behavior and that in turn is free-will. Goals change with age based on
experience which is similar to the way in which movement functions. We hypothesize
that human prefrontal cortex development was a natural expansion of the evolutionarily
earlier developed areas of the frontal lobe and that goal-directed movements and behavior,
including choice and free-will, provided for an expansion of those areas. The same regions
of the human central nervous system that were already employed for better control,
coordination, and timing of movements, expanded in parallel with the frontal cortex. The
initial focus of the frontal lobes was the control of motor activity, but as the movements
became more goal-directed, greater cognitive control over movement was necessitated
leading to voluntary control of FAPs or free-will. The paper reviews the neurobiology,
neurohistology, and electrophysiology of brain connectivities developmentally, along with
the development of those brain functions linked to decision-making from a developmental
viewpoint. The paper reviews the neurological development of the frontal lobes and
inter-regional brain connectivities in the context of optimization of communication systems
within the brain and nervous system and its relation to free-will.
Keywords: free-will, functional connection, fixed-action patterns, self-regulation, frontal-lobe, goal direction,
electrophysiology
THE DEVELOPMENT OF SELF-REGULATION AND
TEMPERAMENT
A two-year-old discovering something that resembles indepen-
dence by saying “no” is exercising his free-will but for the fact
that it is a natural consequence of universal child development,
and, therefore a consequence not of variations of child rearing
practices but rather of built-in component processing that con-
sequentially results in highly predictable behavioral patterns. We
know that some actions are freely chosen and others are auto-
matic reactions. We should be able to characterize the difference
between them. We know that natural phenomena are caused
by other natural phenomena. The activity of the human mind
has been consistently shown to depend on the functioning of
the human brain and the latter consists of natural phenomena
involving neurons, action potentials, neurotransmitters, and so
on. There is no reason to suppose that the causal chains that deter-
mine neural events are broken at some point. There is no need to
deny that free-will exists, since we need this concept to distinguish
between human actions. Therefore, we must understand free-will
as a part of the workings of the human brain. We should change
our concept of freedom, so as to preserve what is essential in it,
eliminating the idea that freedom must escape natural causality.
An action is free when it results from a conscious intention to start
it, continue it, or at least not to refrain from starting or continu-
ing it. There is no need to suppose that this intention must not be
the result of causal processes in the brain. A person is responsible
for an action when this action results from a conscious intention.
To be responsible for an action is not to be ultimately responsible
for it, in the sense of also being responsible for all the events in the
causal chains that led to the existence of the conscious intention
that determined the action. The nature of the neurological com-
ponents of behavioral independence requires examination in the
context of the well-debated, but yet unresolved nature of free-will.
One concept that mediates the behavior of free-will is the
notion of self-regulation and that has been commonly described
developmentally as temperament, mediated in turn by frontal
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lobe function (cf. Leisman and Melillo, 2012). Temperament, in
the context of frontal lobe development, refers to individual dif-
ferences in motor and emotional reactivity and self-regulation
according to Rothbart and Bates (1998). The temperamental vari-
able related to the development of executive attention is termed
effortful control, representing the infant’s ability to inhibit a dom-
inant response in order to perform a sub-dominant response.
The construct of effortful control is extremely important in
understanding the nature of intentionality and free-will.
Most of the more behaviorally based definitions of temper-
ament have focused on temperament’s more reactive aspects
related to positive and negative affect, reward, punishment, and
arousal to stimulation in the development of effortful control
of the child’s behavior. The processes underlying this effortful
control and hence free-will are critical to socialization and have
been studied by many. Kochanska (1995), for example, has had
indicated that free-will is related to temperamental individual
differences in effortful control. He examined longitudinally the
development of the complex relation between compliance and
internalization in childhood. He distinguished between two forms
that he measured, when the child eagerly embraced and endorsed
the mother’s agenda, and situational, when the child was cooper-
ative, but lacked the sincere commitment and feeling of internal
obligation. This psych-social aspect of child development is not
the focus of this paper and hence will not be expanded upon here.
Brain-based systems of effortful control and temperament instead
largely focus on stimulation and either approach or avoidance
responses to that stimulation.
Although the literature on temperament had originally
reflected the notion that temperament systems would be in place
very early in development and change little over time (Buss and
Plomin, 1975; Rowe and Plomin, 1977) we have since learned
that temperament systems follow a developmental course. Infant’s
reactive tendencies to experience and their emotional expressiv-
ity and response to events in their environment can be observed
very early in life. Children’s self-regulatory executive attention
develops relatively late and coincidently with the development of
their frontal and prefrontal cortices throughout the early school
years.
Self-regulation, a direct manifestation of temperament,
involves complex questions about the nature of volition and its
relation to our genetic endowment and to social experiences.
Much of the work on self-regulation has been purely behavioral.
The lack of appropriate methods to study the physiology of the
developing human brain has led to understandable hesitation in
thinking about these processes at the neuro-systems level. Kandel
(1999) however, has argued persuasively that new concepts in
the neurosciences make it possible to relate higher level cognitive
concepts to underlying brain systems.
SELF-REGULATION AND THE CONTROL OF DISTRESS IN THE INFANT
Control of distress is a major task for the infant and caregiver in
the early months of life and of course the tasks involved in dis-
tress control in turn require external or self-regulatory processes.
In the first few months, caregivers help control distress mainly by
holding and rocking. Increasingly in the early months, visual ori-
enting is also used. Caregivers then attempt to involve the child in
activities that will occupy his or her attention and reduce distress.
These interactions between infant and caregiver may train the
infant in the control of distress and lead to the development of the
mid-frontal area as a control system for negative emotion. Later
when similar cognitive challenges arise, a system for regulating
remote brain areas may already be prepared.
Evidence exists for a physiological basis of individual differ-
ences in the self-regulation of distress and its resultant system
of emotional control (inhibition) in human infants. Differences
among infants in negative and positive emotionality are often
assumed to reflect differences in temperament and are expected
to have a constitutional basis (Goldsmith et al., 1987; Porges
and Furman, 2011). According to Rothbart (1989), the consti-
tutional basis of temperament should be reflected in endocrine
processes that may, in turn, be related to genetic differences
among individuals (Buss and Plomin, 1986; Pluess and Belsky,
2011).
We can see in the patterns of resting frontal EEG of neonates
and infants significant individual differences of asymmetry that
tend to remain in a stable fashion across development of the
child and adolescent (Henderson et al., 2001). Davidson and Fox
(1989) examined whether certain features of infant temperament
might be related to individual differences in the asymmetry of
resting frontal activation. EEG was recorded from left and right
frontal and parietal scalp regions of 13 normal 10-month-old
infants. Infant behavior was then observed during a brief period
of maternal separation. Those infants who cried in response to
maternal separation showed greater right frontal activation dur-
ing the preceding baseline period, as exemplified in Figure 1
below, compared with infants who did not cry. Frontal activation
FIGURE 1 | Mean log 6–8Hz power for the resting baseline period in
the left and right frontal and parietal regions for criers (N = 6) and
non-criers (N = 7). (Decreases in 6–8Hz power are indicative of increases
in activation. Error bars indicate standard errors of the mean). (From
Davidson and Fox, 1989).
Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org June 2012 | Volume 6 | Article 36 | 2
Leisman et al. Brain, development, and free-will
asymmetry may be a state-independent marker for individual
differences in the threshold of reactivity to stressful events.
Davidson (2000) had reported that left frontal EEG asymme-
try at rest is associated with differential abilities of neonates to
regulate their own behavior. Fox and colleagues have indicated
that infants displaying elevated left frontal EEG asymmetry at
rest exhibit “easy” temperaments, manifested by reports of these
infants being easily soothed and calmed.
In contrast, Davidson and Fox (1989) noted that negative
affect and a lowered ability by the infant to regulate his or her
affect and behavior is highly associated with lower right frontal
EEG asymmetry at rest. Infants, when crying demonstrated ele-
vated right frontal activity during the baseline conditions preced-
ing crying. This is highly associated with what we have reported
elsewhere in asymmetric activation patterns in ADHD and autis-
tic spectrum children (Leisman and Melillo, 2006; Melillo and
Leisman, 2009a,b). Fox reports that the infant’s who exhibited
this pattern of right frontal EEG asymmetry in the resting state,
can be characterized as having “negative reactive” temperaments
(Fox et al., 2001). These infants are easily distressed, are diffi-
cult to soothe, do not generally self-soothe, and have problems
switching and focusing attention. Although the examination of
neuroelectrical activity is promising with respect to identifying
individual infants with immature or defective neuro-integration
or organization, the examination is limited by our imperfect
understanding of the relationship between such neuroelectrical
activity and behavior at the present time.
Hyperactivity, depression, poor sustained attention, language
difficulties, and impulsive or impetuous behavior are common
in children with inadequately developing frontal lobe function
(Leisman and Melillo, 2012). Children with these behaviors like-
wise have difficulty being able to self-soothe and a difficulty in
impulse control which compromises free-will. These behaviors,
when seen later in middle childhood and beyond, are character-
ized as abnormal. When observed in the neonate and in infancy,
these behaviors are seen as normal. In both of the aforementioned
cases, immaturity of or compromise to the adequate development
of the frontal lobes affects the development of free-will.
FRONTAL LOBES AND AFFECT REGULATION IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF FREE-WILL
FRONTAL LOBES AND MOTOR CONTROL AS AN EVOLUTIONARY
BASIS OF COGNITION AND BEHAVIORAL INHIBITION
Major developmental events in the first year include the corti-
cal inhibition of the brainstem, the improvement in recognition
and working memory, and the appearance of separation anxiety.
From around the age of 3 months, the neonatal palmer grasp
reflex begins to disappear. This event has long been known to be
related in time to the differentiation of the pyramidal neurons in
the supplementary motor cortex (Kennard et al., 1934). Stimuli
are transmitted by the cortico-bulbar tract to the interneurons
in the brainstem. These inhibit the motor neurons by means of
the neurotransmitter GABA, leading to an inhibition of the reflex
action of the muscles of the hand. At this age, the cortico-bulbar
tract shows intensive myelination, accelerating nerve conduction
speed. In the brainstem, synaptic contacts of interneurons to
motor neurons are intensified, and GABA synthesis is increased.
These processes increase the cortical inhibition of brainstem
reflex activity. If brainstem mechanisms controlling respiration
are immature or compromised, then the increased cortical inhibi-
tion could place infants at risk for sudden infant death syndrome,
which can occur around that age (Touwen, 1971; Wiemann et al.,
2008). Conversely, persisting primitive brainstem reflex activity
may be associated with a lack of cortical inhibition.
The frontal lobe (Figure 2) plays a major role in motor activ-
ities like planning and in the execution of movements. The
primary motor area proximal to the precentral gyrus is known
as the motor strip (Brodmanns area 4). This is located just ante-
rior to the central sulcus. The primary motor area is also referred
to as motor area 1 or MI. Anterior to this area are two additional
primary motor areas (Brodmann’s 4, 5, and 6). This supplemen-
tary motor cortex lies anterior to the motor strip and extends
around to the hemisphere’s medial surface. The premotor cortex
lies anterior to the supplementary motor cortex and on the lat-
eral surface of the hemispheres. These motor areas contain motor
neurons whose axons extend to the spinal cord and brainstem
and synapse on motor neurons in the spinal cord. The motor
neurons are located in layer 5, the output layer of the motor cor-
tex. This layer contains large pyramidal cells; they are the largest
neurons in the cerebral cortex. The most anterior region of the
frontal lobe, the prefrontal cortex is responsible for higher aspects
of motor control and planning and in the execution of behav-
ior, all tasks requiring integration of information over time. The
prefrontal cortex has two main areas, the dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex, which is found on the lateral surface of the frontal lobe
anterior to the premotor regions, and the orbitofrontal cortex.
The orbitofrontal cortex is located on the frontal lobe’s anterior-
ventral surface and is more medial. The orbitofrontal cortex
includes limbic lobe structures and is connected to them.
The frontal lobe is the largest lobe in humans (Figure 2),
represents one-third of the neocortex and the prefrontal cortex
constitutes approximately 50% of the size of the frontal lobes. The
prefrontal cortex is included in a neuronal system that includes
the basal ganglia, the thalamus, and the cerebellum. Most of the
higher andmore complexmotor, cognitive, and emotional behav-
ioral functions are thought to be found primarily in the frontal
lobes. This area of the neocortex has expanded evolutionarily
more than any other in the human brain.
The prefrontal cortex is unique to humans; the reference to
highbrow, for example, is a reference to the structural changes
of the forehead that we humans underwent to provide more
space for our prefrontal cortices. It is thought that most of the
unique qualities that humans possess are found or connected in
some way with the expansion of the prefrontal cortex. This brain
region is also important because the frontal lobes include areas of
motor control as well. Proceeding anteriorly in the frontal lobes
from the motor strip to the supplementary motor areas and the
premotor cortices, we see the control of motor activity becom-
ing more sophisticated (Figure 3). We also see that as the brain
expanded and evolved anteriorly, the frontal lobes became more
concerned with the cognitive control, timing, and duration of
movement whereas the motor strip was an evolutionary advance
giving humans greater gross voluntary motor control. The newer
areas of the frontal lobe provide more precision and direction to
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FIGURE 2 | Cytoarchitecture of the cortex with reference to the frontal
lobes according to Broadmann. Areas 1, 2, and 3, Primary Somatosensory
Cortex; Area 4, Primary Motor Cortex; Area 5, Somatosensory Association
Cortex; Area 6, Pre-Motor and Supplementary Motor Cortex (Secondary
Motor Cortex); Area 7, Somatosensory Association Cortex; Area 8, Includes
Frontal eye fields; Area 9, Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; Area 10, Frontopolar
area (most rostral part of superior and middle frontal gyri); Area 11,
Orbitofrontal area (orbital and rectus gyri, plus part of the rostral part of the
superior frontal gyrus); Area 12, Orbitofrontal area (used to be part of BA11,
refers to the area between the superior frontal gyrus and the inferior rostral
sulcus); Area 17, Primary Visual Cortex (V1); Area 18, Visual Association Cortex
(V2); Area 19, (V3); Area 20, Inferior Temporal gyrus; Area 21, Middle Temporal
gyrus; Area 22, Superior Temporal Gyrus, of which the rostral part participates
to Wernicke’s area; Area 23, Ventral Posterior cingulate cortex; Area 24,
Ventral Anterior cingulate cortex; Area 25, Subgenual cortex; Area 26,
Ectosplenial area; Area 28, Posterior Entorhinal Cortex; Area 29,
Retrosplenial cingular cortex; Area 30, Part of cingular cortex; Area 31, Dorsal
Posterior cingular cortex; Area 32, Dorsal anterior cingulate cortex; Area 34,
Anterior Entorhinal Cortex (on the Parahippocampal gyrus); Area 35, Perirhinal
cortex (on the Parahippocampal gyrus); Area 36, Parahippocampal cortex (on
the Parahippocampal gyrus); Area 37, Fusiform gyrus; Area 38, Temporopolar
area (most rostral part of the superior and middle temporal gyri); Area 39,
Angular gyrus, part of Wernicke’s area; Area 40, Supramarginal gyrus part of
Wernicke’s area; Areas 41 and 42, Primary and Auditory Association
Cortex; Area 43, Subcentral area (between insula and post/precentral gyrus);
Area 44, pars opercularis, part of Broca’s area; Area 45, pars triangularis
Broca’s area; Area 46, Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; Area 47, Inferior
prefrontal gyrus.
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FIGURE 3 | Compared to other parts of the brain, frontal lobe
development is on a delayed timetable. As frontal lobes mature
throughout childhood and adolescence, the ability to think
through, inhibit, and plan actions as well as executive functions of
governing emotions, judgment, planning, organization, problem
solving, impulse inhibition, abstraction, analysis/synthesis,
self-awareness and self-concept, and identity gradually
develops.
the movement. Eventually we see that the prefrontal cortex has lit-
tle to do with the movement per se, but became largely concerned
with the control of direction of the movement and the behavior
that drives that movement.
FRONTAL LOBES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF GOAL-DIRECTED
BEHAVIOR
It is well-established that humans need normal frontal lobes to
accomplish goals, make decisions, express creatively, and navigate
through complex social situations (Chatterjee, 1998). The frontal
lobes regulate goal-directed behavior, a hierarchy of reflexive
movements, cross-temporal contingencies, approach and avoid-
ance behavior, response inhibition, and perseveration. As we will
see, all of the activities that the prefrontal cortex controls revolve
around improvement of goal-directed behavior.
We hypothesize that the development of the human prefrontal
cortices was a natural expansion of the evolutionarily earlier
developed areas of the frontal lobe and that goal-directed move-
ments and behavior provided for an expansion of those areas.
The same regions of the human central nervous system that were
already employed for better control, coordination, and timing of
movements, expanded in parallel with the frontal cortex. The lat-
eral portions of the cerebellum, for example, are more involved
with the cognitive coordination and control of motor activity
than with the control of the actual movement of muscles. The
ventral lateral thalamus, linking the lateral cerebellum to the pre-
frontal cortex, is witness to the fact that these two areas evolved
together. There must have developed a partnership between the
cerebellum and the prefrontal cortex. The initial focus of the
frontal lobes was the control of motor activity as it was for the
cerebellum, but as the movements became more goal-directed,
greater cognitive control over movement was necessitated.
The prefrontal cortex was required in higher organisms and in
humans not just for more speed, precision, and coordination, but
also for the provision of a control mechanism for memory of pre-
vious motor actions, projection of future movements, facilitation
and inhibition of movement and the reaction or inhibition of
reaction to stimuli; to know when to move toward prey or away
from a predator. All of these involve higher cognitive control that
all link to the emotion controlling limbic system which provides
motivation, emotion in general, and aggression/temperament in
particular, and autonomic self-regulation, the subject of free-will.
The links of frontal and prefrontal regions of the cortex to the
limbic system, discussed in greater detail later, had as its main
function the provision of a mechanism to either allow the organ-
ism to catch the prey, to run from a predator, or to seek a mate.
The frontal lobes then in coordination with the cerebellum and
basal ganglia have expanded beyond their control of movements
and have evolved to control the behaviors that guide goal-directed
movement andmost of our basic actions, but driven in largemea-
sure by emotionality and its regulation, based upon approach and
avoidance behavior.
It had been previously thought that the functions of the pre-
frontal cortex and its role in cognitive or emotional activities
were separate from other motor areas of the frontal lobe (Luria,
1966). Therefore, motor functions of the frontal lobe did not
necessarily relate to its non-motor function. However, it can be
alternatively viewed that goal-directed behaviors are merely evo-
lutionary expansions of goal-directed movements, and that all of
the activities of the frontal lobe are variations and refinements
of the same function. Achieving a goal is provided by the stimula-
tion of the limbic system and therefore of emotionality. Therefore,
temperament and frontal lobe development are associated and
relate directly to the notion of free-will or choices made in the
manifestation of goal-directed behavior.
THE LONG DEVELOPMENT OF THE PREFRONTAL CORTEX, AND
CRITICAL PERIODS FOR BEHAVIORAL INHIBITION AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF FREE-WILL
Like other primates, humans are born with an immature brain.
After birth, the cerebral cortex experiences a massive proliferation
of synapses (synaptogenesis), followed by an extended pruning
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period (synaptic elimination). In the Rhesus Macaque—an
old-world monkey whose brain development has been studied
extensively—these developmental processes occur at the same
rate in all cortical areas (Rakic et al., 1986). In contrast, anal-
yses of human cortex across the life span (using autopsy tissue
samples) reveal a different pattern. In humans, synaptogene-
sis reaches its peak in visual and auditory cortex within a few
months after birth, but the increase in the number of synap-
tic junctions occurs much more slowly in the pre-frontal cortex
(Huttenlocher and Dabholkar, 1997) (Figure 4). In the evolution
of the human brain, there has thus been a shift from concurrent
to heterochronous cortical development. The synaptic density of
human PFC does not “catch up” with auditory cortex until the
fourth year of life. Heterochronicity in human cortical develop-
ment is also observed in measurements of dendritic arborization,
regional metabolism (the extent of anabolic and catabolic pro-
cesses within a brain region), and myelination (Chugani and
Phelps, 1986).
As a result of this long period of prefrontal development,
human children require an extended period to affect behavioral
and cognitive control and thereby develop and exert free-will.
The extended period of early child behavior is akin to adult
patients with neurological PFC damage. Changes in both work-
ing memory capacity and the ability to produce behaviors that
conflict with prepotent responses—two canonical frontal lobe
functions—are linked to the maturation of PFC (e.g., Diamond
and Doar, 1989). Furthermore, the extended immaturity of PFC
may carry the cost of a longer period of vulnerability than that
which occurs in more rapidly-developing cortical systems.
In the domain of emotion, crucial early experiences must
occur for behavioral development to proceed on a normal track
and for the brain systems underlying these behaviors to develop
normally. This is achieved by neural plasticity. Greenough and
colleagues have expanded on the notion of critical period and
coined the term experience-expectant (Markham and Greenough,
2004), by which they mean a process by which synapses form
after some minimal experience and is common to all members
of the species thereby saving the genome the trouble of orches-
trating and regulating all aspects of development. It is for this
reason that the frontal lobes speak very well to the issue of the
dynamics of change in early infant development. In general, we
have a developmental pattern of temporary overproduction of
synapses distributed within a relatively wide area during early
development, followed by a subsequent retraction of synapses
that had either not formed any or that had formed abnormal
connections. The nature of neuronal connectivity is illustrated
in Figure 5 below. The expected experience produces patterns of
neuronal activity, targeting those synapses that will be selected for
preservation. The assumption is that synaptic contacts are initially
transient and require some type of confirmation for their contin-
ued survival. If such confirmation is not obtained, synapses will
be retracted according to a developmental schedule or as a result
of competition from confirmed synaptic connectivities (Black,
1998; Leisman and Koch, 2009).
In attempting to understand the neurosciences of free-will
and in contradistinction to the above, Greenough and colleagues
speak of experience-dependent neurogenesis. This is the process
that optimizes the individual’s adaptation to specific and pos-
sibly unique features of the environment e.g., learning. Thus,
for any given instance, diverse information will be obtained and
stored for use at a later time, giving rise to individual differences
in a variety of cognitive domains, including temperament and
FIGURE 4 | Brain cells develop connections over the first two years of the infant’s life. These connectivities are formed, altered, and actively sculpted over
the first 20 + years of life.
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FIGURE 5 | Cerebral metabolic rate as a function of age. Elevated
CMRGlc during 3–10 years corresponds to era of exuberant connectivity
needed for energy needs of neuronal processes which is greater
by a factor of 2 in childhood as compared to adults. PET shows
relative glucose metabolic rate. We see the complexity of dendritic
structures of cortical neurons consistent with expansion of
synaptic connectivities and increases in capillary density in frontal
cortex.
emotionality. The fundamental difference between experience-
expectant and experience-dependent development is that the
former applies in a similar fashion to all members of the species,
whereas the latter applies to individual members, seen in normal
emotional development in infancy.
The massive overproduction of synapses by the brain early in
life followed postnatally by selective elimination of these exuber-
ant connections has as its likely purpose the preparation of the
nervous system for experience by the proliferation of connec-
tions on a sensory system-wide basis. Experience-related neuronal
activity can then select functionally appropriate subsets of the
abundant synaptic connections (represented in Figure 6). This
period of excessive synaptogenesis is also correlated with a burst
of brain metabolism and, at least in the monkey, with the onset
of social interactions (Jacobs et al., 1995). The slow development
of the frontal lobe allows the infant of the slow journey through
circuit developments necessary for response inhibition, socializa-
tion, and emotional control. From the perspective we propose
here, the adults’ ability to control their responses allows them to
mix and match correct and incorrect signs for the same things at
different times, such that staying true to their probabilistic under-
standing leads them to produce noisy patterns of input. Absent
these control abilities, young children will practice (and hence
learn) only the most frequent of any alternate patterns they hear
(Ramscar and Yarlett, 2007). This allows children to learn con-
ventions from the output of parents who, because of the parents’
ability to monitor and control their responses, may teach a cor-
rect response without the adults being able to master the correct
responses themselves!
CORTICAL AND LIMBIC INTERACTIONS IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF SELF-REGULATION AND FREE-WILL
We can now explore in more detail the cortical and limbic
interactions that are involved (represented in Figure 6) in the
development of free-will. The literature has indicated that lesions
in the dominant (right-handers) or the left hemisphere typically
result in what has been termed “catastrophic reaction,” for exam-
ple, tears, despair, and anger. Damage to the right hemisphere,
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FIGURE 6 | The corticolimbic system consists of several brain regions
that include the rostral anterior cingulate cortex, hippocampal
formation, and basolateral amygdala. The anterior cingulate cortex has a
central role in processing emotional experiences at the conscious level and
selective attentional responses. Emotionally related learning is mediated
through the interactions of the basolateral amygdala and hippocampal
formation and motivational responses are processed through the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex (from Benes, 2010).
which in most people is the minor hemisphere, is accompanied
by indifference reactions such as unawareness, euphoria, or lack
of concern (Goldstein, 1952; Gainotti, 1970, 1972). Therefore,
the left and right hemispheres, based on this early research, were
thought to result in opposite emotional tone with the left nor-
mally being more oriented toward a positive mood, whereas the
right was oriented toward a more negative mood. Other studies
have confirmed that pathologic crying occurs with left hemi-
spheric lesions (Poeck, 1969; Rinn, 1984). It has been reported by
Sackheim and associates (1982) that changes in affect following
unilateral injury are due to disinhibition of contralateral corti-
cal regions and not because of release of ipsilateral subcortical
areas.
Anterior and posterior cortical regions appear to express dif-
ferent levels of control over the vertical hierarchy of subcortical
centers (Robinson et al., 1984; Starkstein et al., 1988). It is fur-
ther thought that the right hemisphere global conceptual skills
may be critical to combining external and internal environmental
information to achieve the integration of emotional experience
(Safer and Leventhal, 1977). In other words, it is thought that
the right hemisphere is able to access internal feelings that mon-
itor an individual’s internal state (Buck, 1985). It appears that
the right hemisphere has greater interconnectivity between areas
of the right hemisphere than the left hemisphere (Leisman and
Ashkenazi, 1980; Iturria-Medina et al., 2011). This suggests that
the specialized psychological abilities are due to its more diffuse
interconnections, which provide it with a more dynamic and
holistic integration across different sensory modalities.
It has been postulated that with lesions of the dorsolateral
and dorsomedial prefrontal cortices, that exclude the frontal con-
vexity, both slowness, indifference, apathy, and lack of initiative
result. On the other hand, lesions of the orbito-frontal cortex
appear to lead to disinhibition, lack of social constraint, hyper-
activity, grandiose thinking, and euphoria (Smith et al., 2006;
Volkow et al., 2011). There is also a lateral orbito-frontal circuit,
projecting from the orbito-frontal cortex and connecting to dif-
ferent parts of the caudate and globus pallidus, which project to
the thalamus and back to the orbito-frontal cortex. This circuit
is thought to be involved in the control of inhibitory responses
during learning and recognition tasks requiring frequent shifts
of set developing during infancy. This may explain persever-
ation or repetitive compulsive behavior seen with damage to
the orbito-frontal cortex and the perseveration seen in infancy.
Another circuit, the anterior cingulate circuit, includes the ventral
striatum, nucleus accumbens, and medio-dorsal nucleus of the
thalamus. The hippocampus and entorhinal cortex are thought
to send inputs to this circuit, which integrates information from
the para-limbic association cortex.
Most researchers agree that approach and withdrawal are fun-
damental motivational behaviors, which are found at all levels
of phylogeny. It has been postulated that the frontal lobes or
anterior regions of the left and right hemispheres are specialized
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for approach and withdrawal behavior, respectively (Davidson,
1984, 1987, 1988; Davidson and Tomarken, 1989; Davidson et al.,
1990). This is thought partly because the left frontal region has
been noted as an important center for intention, self-regulation,
and planning (Luria, 1973). This area is thought to be the region
that produces behaviors that have been described as “free-will.”
Volitional self-regulatory behavior is a significant part of the
notion of free-will consistent with the view of most theorists
on the topic. Ziaie (cf. Rothbart et al., 1992) performed a lon-
gitudinal study (at 3, 6.5, 10, and 13.5 months) in which the
development of behaviors that serve to regulate distress were
observed. The study was part of a larger longitudinal study in
which infants were presented with auditory, visual, and tactile
stimuli varying in novelty, intensity, and complexity, and their
reactions videotaped. Because these episodes were designed to
evoke emotional reactions, they proved to elicit a number of self-
regulatory strategies as well. Behaviors that had been identified as
self-regulatory in the literature were grouped together into larger
functional categories of forms of self-regulation (Rothbart and
Derryberry, 1981).
The larger categories included Active Avoidance (includ-
ing specific behaviors of Arch Back, Arm Retraction, Leave
Chair, Lean Away, Push Back, and Withdraw Hand), Orientation
TowardMother (Look TowardMother, Lean TowardMother, and
Leave Chair Toward Mother), Disengagement of Attention (Gaze
Aversion, Look Down, Look Away, Turn Head, and Look Toward
Experimenter), Approach (Lean Forward, Reach, Point-Reach,
and Inhibited Reach), Attack (Bang Toy, Pounding, and Push Toy
Away), Body Self-Stimulation (Arm Movement, Banging, Body
Movement, Kicking, and Repeated Hand Movement), Tactile
Self-Soothing including Hand-Mouth Activity (Hand-Mouth,
Mouthing), Touch Ear-Head, Clasp Hands, and Respiration
(Heavy Breathing, Sigh, and Yawn).
Rothbart and Derryberry related self-regulatory behaviors
to infant temperament by investigating relationships between
infants’ self-regulation at 13.5 months and emotionality as
reported by the mother and observed in the laboratory. They
found that by 13 months, the negative emotions of fear and
“distress to limitations” were differentially related to patterns of
self-regulation, with fear related to less active forms of coping,
and “distress to limitations” to active attack.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF MECHANISMS OF ATTENTION IN
EMOTIONALITY AND SELF-REGULATORY BEHAVIOR: THE
NEUROLOGICAL CAPACITY FOR SOCIAL INTERACTION
MEDIATES THE DEVELOPMENT OF FREE-WILL
Associated with approach-withdrawal developments is its relation
to the development of attentional disengagement. The marked
development of infants’ orienting of attention in space under-
goes marked development between two and six months of life,
with changes related to infants’ preferences for novel locations
(Clohessy et al., 2001), their ability to disengage gaze from an
external stimulus (Johnson et al., 2007), and their ability to antic-
ipate the location of upcoming visual events (Haith et al., 1988).
The development of infants’ ability to disengage attention from
one location so as to be able to move it to another and their
ability to anticipate the location of future events is particularly
important for the early self-regulation, self-control of emotion,
and therefore free-will.
The development of these attentional abilities is in turn
related to brain development (Johnson, 1990). Evidence from
neuroanatomy indicates that only the deeper layers of primary
visual cortex are supportive of organized activity in the newborn.
During the first weeks of life, development of middle level lamina
comes to support an inhibitory pathway to the superior collicu-
lus. For a period of several weeks, this control system may inhibit
disengagement when the infant is engaged at a visual location.
It is likely that this development is also responsible for the phe-
nomenon of “obligatory attention” observed in young infants,
where infants may look at a single location for extended peri-
ods, sometimes appearing to try to move their gaze but not being
able to, and become distressed after a period of intent looking
(Rothbart and Posner, 1985). By 4 months, development of both
the parietal cortex (Posner and Peterson, 1990) and/or frontal
eye field connections (Johnson, 1990) allows for more flexible
disengagement of attention and greater self-regulation for the
infant.
These early developments in attentional control are of interest
to those who study social-emotional development because early
changes in social interaction are related to these changing patterns
of self-regulation. When caregiver and infant are observed inter-
acting with one another in the vis a vis position (face-to-face),
periods of extended visual orienting of the infant toward the
mother seen at 6 and 13 weeks are followed by decreased orient-
ing toward her by 6.5 months (Kaye and Fogel, 1980). In other
studies, a shift of infant visual orienting to foci other than the
mother has been observed by about 4 months of age (Kaye and
Fogel, 1980; Cohn and Tronick, 1987). This change in infant ori-
enting is often associated with the mother turning the infant away
from the vis a vis position so that the child can more easily look
around.
What we know then is that in self-regulation infants at three
months infants already demonstrate ability to stimulate or soothe
themselves, but engage in few approach behaviors. In compari-
son to three-month-old infants, six-month-old infants are more
active stimulus seekers. They demonstrate greater use of orga-
nized patterns of motor behavior such as reaching, which show-
ing further increases to 13 months of age. In comparison with
their behavior at six months, 10-month-olds appear generally
inhibited, showing less active self-stimulating behavior and more
self-soothing. Increases in inhibitory capacity, self-soothing, and
social communication thus appear to be hallmarks of devel-
opment of self-regulation at 10 months. Thirteen-month-old
infants, in comparison to 10-month-old infants, are more active
at seeking stimulation, showed less self-soothing, more approach,
fewer avoidance behaviors, and more self-stimulating behaviors
than 10-month-old infants.
In their attentional regulation, they further increased their
visual regard toward human beings as opposed to inanimate
aspects of the environment. They also showed greater gestural
communication in pointing and an increased ability to move
objects away from themselves rather than moving themselves
away from the objects. In general, a change from more pallia-
tive methods of self-regulation (e.g., clasping, mouthing) to more
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active coping, and a decrease over time in near receptor activity
is seen. Overall, there were no changes in frequency of attentional
disengagement from stimuli after six months, but older infants
were more likely to redirect their attention toward their moth-
ers. Major changes in disengagement occur between three and
four months. The summary of the literature indicates that 3–13
months is a period of rapid development in self-regulatory behav-
iors, with little individual stability in their use other than in oral
self-soothing, and with disengagement of attention continuing to
be related to lower susceptibility to distress and consistent with
the development of inhibitory systems (Rothbart et al., 1992).
The absence or impairment of inhibitory systems results in well
known disorders of disinhibition such as Tourette’s syndrome
(Ozonoff et al., 1998; Orth et al., 2005) or Obsessive-Compulsive
Disorder (Moritza and vonMühlenen, 2005) which can be viewed
as disorders of free-will and speak therefore to the neurological
control of that function.
DISCUSSION
The nature of free-will as a subset of intentionality, and prob-
abilistic and deterministic function, has indicated that human
behavior is highly predictable which in turn, in part compromises
a notion of a free-will. The literature supports the notion that
age relates to the ability to progressively more effectively estab-
lish goals that are performed by fixed action patterns and that
these FAPs produce outcomes and that these outcomes in turn
modify choices (free-will) for which fixed action patterns need
to be employed. Early goals require behaviors that need to be
automated in terms of FAPs and that they in turn lead to an indi-
vidual’s goals being achieved or not; if not, then one can change
behavior and that in turn is free-will.
Goals change with age based on experience which is similar to
the way in which movement functions. We have supported the
notion that the development of the human prefrontal cortices is a
natural expansion of the evolutionarily earlier developed areas of
the frontal lobe and that goal-directed movements and behavior
including choice and free-will have provided for an expansion of
those areas. The same regions of the human central nervous sys-
tem that were already employed for better control, coordination,
and timing of movement, expanded in parallel with the frontal
cortex. The lateral portions of the cerebellum, for example, are
more involved with the cognitive coordination and control of
motor activity than with the control of the actual movement of
muscles. The ventral lateral thalamus, linking the lateral cere-
bellum to the prefrontal cortex, is witness to the fact that these
two areas evolved together. There must have developed a part-
nership between the cerebellum and the prefrontal cortex. The
initial focus of the frontal lobes was the control of motor activ-
ity as it was for the cerebellum, but as the movements became
more goal-directed, greater cognitive control over movement was
necessitated and hence a necessity for “free-will.”
The prefrontal cortex was required in higher organisms and
in humans not just for more speed, precision, and coordination,
but also for the provision of a control mechanism for memory of
previous motor actions, projection of future movements, facilita-
tion and inhibition of movement and the reaction or inhibition
of reaction to stimuli; to know when to move toward prey or
away from a predator. All of these involve higher cognitive con-
trol of the emotion controlling limbic system which provides
motivation, emotion, aggression/temperament, and autonomic
regulation.
The links of frontal and prefrontal regions of the cortex to
the limbic system had as its main function the provision of a
mechanism to either allow the organism to catch the prey, to run
from a predator, or to seek a mate, or choice. The frontal lobes
then, in coordination with the cerebellum and basal ganglia, have
expanded beyond their control of movements and have evolved
to control the behaviors that guide goal-directed movement and
most of our basic actions, but driven in large measure by emo-
tionality and its regulation, based upon approach and avoidance
behavior.
A separate discussion involves not free-will per se but rather
the responsibility over one’s actions that results from free-will
and these issues are oftentimes confused. We have seen that
desires and actions are developmentally based on brain pro-
cesses that are predicated on inhibition-facilitation and related to
approach-avoidance dimensions and that are also predicated on
the developing but integrated function of networks in the brain.
All action and desire are driven by various brain processes. It can
be questioned that while it is that the brain and nervous sys-
tem are responsible for all human action and reaction, we human
beings consider that we are responsible only when the system is
intact but not when a tumor or dysfunction “causes” an act.
Sinnott-Armstrong and colleagues have examined individuals
with brain tumors or other clearly neurologically based con-
ditions including Tourette’s syndrome, alien hand syndrome,
addiction, psychopathy, and other mental illnesses, to obtain
a better understanding of the notion of “responsibility.” How
people judge something to be morally right or wrong is a fun-
damental question of both the sciences and the humanities
(Sinnott-Armstrong, 2011). Sinott-Armstrong has introduced a
novel distinction between “moral deliberation,” or the weighing
of moral considerations, and the formation of a “moral verdict,”
or the commitment to one moral conclusion. Hemodynamic
activity in the bilateral anterior insula and basal ganglia was found
to be correlated with committing to the moral verdict “this is
morally wrong” as opposed to “this is morally not-wrong,” a
finding that is consistent with research from economic decision-
making. Using comparisons of deliberation-locked vs. verdict-
locked analyses, it had also been demonstrated that hemodynamic
activity in high-level cortical regions previously implicated in
morality-including the ventro-medial prefrontal cortex, posterior
cingulate cortex, and temporoparietal junction, was related pri-
marily with moral deliberation as opposed to moral verdicts. The
findings are consistent with individuals with psychopathologies
who may possess moral judgment but impaired moral behavior.
Sinott-Armstrong and colleagues (Schaich et al., 2006) using
fMRI have inferred the parts of the brain that activate when
different types of moral judgments are made. Different cogni-
tive functions and different brain mechanisms are involved when
people make a moral judgment of an act causing harm (for exam-
ple, a murder or theft) than when they judge an act seen as
“impure” but harmless (such as special cases of cannibalism or
consensual incest) or dishonest but harmless (such as some lies
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or broken promises). Each of these acts is termed “immoral,” but
at a physical level, morality is not a unified concept yet free-will
seems to be. With conscious free-will and its bearing on legal and
moral responsibility, we normally excuse people whose acts are
not caused by their conscious choices, such as sleepwalkers who
murder and those with neoplasms who have committed crimes.
Surprisingly, recent research suggests that conscious choice
plays a smaller role in our actions than most people assume.
In particular, it often comes after brain activity that initiates
bodily movements, and many researchers conclude that the con-
scious choice does not cause the movement (cf. Melillo and
Leisman, 2009a,b). That conclusion raises the disturbing ques-
tions of whether and how we can ever really be responsible for
anything. Known for a while is the necessity to automate as
much as possible which arises from the need to reduce infor-
mation overload on the nervous system due to its relatively lim-
ited capacity for instantaneous information processing (Leisman,
1976; Melillo and Leisman, 2009a,b). This is precisely the rea-
son why we neither look nor need to do so when walking down
a flight of stairs. The issue of responsibility is both scientific
and moral. Freedom exists within a deterministic universe. Our
knowledge surrounding consciousness is incomplete, and it may
ultimately transpire that brain activity does not cause conscious
decision-making or vice versa, but rather a variety of cognitive
processes occurring almost simultaneously (Leisman andMelillo,
2012).
In conclusion it has been suggested by Perez-Velazquez (2012,
Pers. communication) that Michael Gazzaniga’s (2005) views
on the subject bears revisiting, when he stated, “. . . Brains are
automatic, rule-governed, determined devices, while people are
personally responsible agents, free to make their own decision.
Just as traffic is what happens when physically determined cars
interact, responsibility is what happens when people interact.
Personal responsibility is a public concept. It exists in a group, not
in an individual. If you were the only person on earth, there would
be no concept of personal responsibility. Responsibility is a con-
cept you have about other people’s actions and they have about
yours. Brains are determined; people follow rules when they live
together and out of that interaction arises the concept of freedom
of action . . . They exists only in the relationships that exist when
automatic brains interact with other automatic brains.”
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